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Abstract:  
This paper aims to investigate the importance of the macroeconomic impact of oil prices 
variations on Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). The topic was selected 
due to the significance of those leading emerging economies in global markets and to the 
determining role of oil in the current economy of the BRICS.  The research was built upon on 
the Granger causality test, the impulse response function and the Cholesky variance 
decomposition by fitting both linear and non-linear multivariate VAR models. The model 
includes oil price inflation and consumer price inflation, interest rates, unemployment rates, 
exchange rates, imports and exports, and total industrial production. The results showed a 
significant impact of oil prices on the BRICS economies mainly in terms of total industrial 
production, exports and imports, and evidence of asymmetry was found. The remaining 
outcomes showed different results depending on whether the country is oil-exporting or oil-
importing.   
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1. Introduction:  
Since the oil shock crises in the 1970s, understanding the impact of oil price variations has 
been at the heart of research. The importance of this topic is first due to the continual growth 
of the world oil demand, from 73,38 Million Barrels per Day (Mb/d) in 1997 to more than 100 
Mb/d expected by 2018. (International Energy Agency, 2017). Specifically, this increase seems 
to be sharper for the BRICS countries as they are at a differing level of industrialisation, 
therefore needing considerable energy supply. China is now the second largest oil-consuming 
country in the world after the United States (IEA, 2017). India occupies the third position, and 
because of the economic development the country is experiencing, its demand for oil continues 
to escalate (IEA, 2015). With regard to the African continent, South Africa is the leader in 
terms of oil consumption, especially since the country has been witnessing rapid growth since 
1994. The oil supply becomes even more important if one considers the limited oil reserves 
South Africa has (IEA, 2015). Moreover, Brazil is not only a large producer of oil in the world, 
but also one of the highest oil-consuming countries in the American continent after the United 
States and Canada. The only net-exporting country in the BRICS is Russia (Fattouh et al., 2015), 
where the revenues from oil and gas account for half of the budget earnings (EIA, 2015). 
Importantly, Cheng et al. (2007) and Singh and Dube (2014) confirmed the escalating weight 
of the BRICS in the global economy, forecasting it to become “the largest global economic 
group by the middle of the century”. This represents one motive for investigating the oil price 
impact on inflation for the BRICS. Another motive is the limited number of research papers on 
this association. The majority of papers discussed the effect of oil price fluctuation in the United 
States (i.e. Hooker, 1999; Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta, 2010; Blanchard and Riggi, 2013). 
Other papers have focused on European countries (i.e. Alvarez et al., 2010; Filis, 2010; 
Chatziantoniou et al., 2012) and less commonly the Asian countries (i.e. Cunado and De Gracia, 
2004, Rafiq and Salim, 2014).   
 
2. Literature Review  
Among the first studies which focused on inflation, Hooker (1999) found that before 1980, 
econometric findings suggest that variations of oil prices have considerably contributed to 
inflation increases, an impact that decreases from the early eighties. This research is cited by 
Cunado and De Gracia (2004), who found that this effect is limited to the short-run. The 
difference is likely due to the time lag between the two papers. Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta 
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(2010) have been more precise by asserting that, although the relationship between inflation 
and oil price experienced weakness from the 2000s in the US, the greater the oil prices volatility, 
the higher are the inflation levels. Those findings were shared by Wu and Ni (2011) and 
Blanchard and Gali (2007). Notwithstanding a change across time, those latter remarked that 
61% of inflation variation in the US is due to oil price changes. However, one question that 
needs to be considered is whether the log-linear approximation employed is valid with extreme 
oil price volatility; as only the mean would be considered and not the variance (Zietz, 2006). 
Cologni and Manera (2008) provided both long term and short term analysis when reviewing 
the impact on the G-7 countries. They concluded that oil price shocks lead not only to higher 
inflation and lower output, but also have a significant impact on interest rates. The latter would 
be the central banks’ response for absorbing the shock through its monetary policy. Likewise, 
Filis (2010) affirmed the short run positive relationship between oil prices and inflation in 
Greece as well as a negative long run relationship with regards to the Athens Stock Exchange. 
By contrast, Leblanc and Chinn (2004) affirmed that oil price impact is limited, as did 
Blanchard and Riggi (2013). Alvarez et al. (2010) reviewed the impact of oil price volatility 
on unemployment and found that with extreme oil price volatility, unemployment rates tends 
to increase especially in industrialised countries that need a high energy supply. Lastly, they 
observed that the macroeconomic transmission mechanism of oil price variation tends to lack 
a deep understanding and is comparatively poorly developed.  
Among the limited number of studies which focused on the macro-economy of countries from 
the BRICS, Rafiq and Salim (2014) found that oil price volatility had a significant impact on 
Chinese GDP as well as on Indian GDP and inflation. However, this paper presented some 
limitations especially regarding the small data set which did not allow adding more variables 
to the model. Izatov (2015) affirmed this considerable effect on the Russian GDP. With regards 
to Brazil, Cavalcanti and Jalles (2013) asserted that this impact is limited and unclear, by 
contrast with South Africa which is highly influenced by its fluctuations, as revealed by Kin 
and Courage (2014) and Niyimbanira (2013). 
Iwayemi and Fowewe (2011) analysed the impact of oil shocks on African exporting countries. 
They claimed that three factors explain why oil prices do not have a significant macroeconomic 
impact: the decrease of oil dependency in the majority of countries, the important impact of 
monetary policies in absorbing the shocks, and lastly the asymmetrical impact of those shocks. 
Numerous papers have confirmed the existence of this latter asymmetric effect of oil price 
variations on the economy. Du, He and Wei (2010) analysed the asymmetric impact of oil 
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prices on China and concluded that the positive shocks do not have a considerable influence 
on Chinese economic growth, by contrast with negative shocks which have led to decline. 
Furthermore, Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) identified that both oil prices increases and 
decreases were important for the Iranian inflation. 
Interestingly, the majority of the papers considering the asymmetric impact, namely Curnado 
and De Gracia (2003); Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005); Jbir and Zouari Ghorbel (2008), 
Mehrara (2008), Du, He and Wei (2010); Berument, Ceylan and Dogan (2010); and Iwayemi 
and Fowowe (2010; 2011) followed Lee et al. (1995)’s paper. Remarkably, Lee et al. (1995)’s 
model, with Mork (1989)’s and Hamilton (1996)’s, seem to be one of the most appropriate in 
modelling the asymmetry of oil prices impact. Nevertheless, it is argued that Mork’s (1989) 
model isolates each of the positive and negative repercussions which may conceal the 
substantial impact of oil prices variations (Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009). In contrast, Lee 
et al. (1995)’s model was distinguished by its ability to examine the environment in which oil 
price fluctuations occur through a GARCH model. Hamilton (2008) justified the use of ARCH 
models in such macroeconomic analysis for two reasons: The first argument being the 
inaccurate standard errors or the spurious regression where “a true null hypothesis is 
asymptotically rejected with probability one”, from the OLS method. The other reason is the 
outliers and the “high-variance episodes” that may mislead any interpretations of the outcomes. 
As Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) pointed out, an oil price shock would be of a higher 
weight in a steady environment compared to its weight in unstable circumstances, which 
explains the scaled transformation of oil prices. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section explains the methodology, 
after which the results are elaborated with a discussion specific to every country. Finally, 
concluding remarks are presented. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Variable choice 
This paper is built upon the following set of variables: nominal crude oil prices expressed in 
US dollar (OilP), total industrial production (TIP) used as a proxy for GDP, consumer price 
indexes (CPI, 2010=100) to measure inflation, interest rates (IR)  as monthly data of 3-months 
governmental treasury bills, unemployment rates (UR), exchange rates  (EXR) expressed in 
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the national currency to US Dollar spot exchange rate; and lastly exports (EXP) and imports 
(IMP) defined as the total value goods in US Dollars. The rationale behind this selection is the 
availability of monthly data for the BRICS. The data was collected from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis, the OECD database, the World Bank, the International Energy Agency and 
Thomas Reuters DataStream. The only variable unavailable was the monthly unemployment 
rate for India. 
Variables were subject to changes and the VAR included oil price inflation, CPI inflation, 
changes in interest rates, in unemployment rates and exchange rates, and exports and imports 
growth. 
With regards to the choice of oil prices, their specification in nominal or real terms presented 
certain discrepancies (Kilian and Vigfussion, 2010). Although Hamilton (2005) argued that 
there is no difference in testing oil shocks when using nominal or real prices, it has been 
suggested that nominal prices would be more suitable as it is an explanatory variable. More 
clearly, it is claimed that real oil prices are influenced by major events or adjusted by inflation 
or deflation, which makes it “endogenous with respect to the economy” (Hamilton (2005). 
Therefore, the choice of nominal oil price is based on the need for “exogeneity” in the 
interpretation of empirical results. Moreover, Hamilton (2010) argued that the producers’ crude 
oil price is a “better proxy” than the refiners’ price, as it allows less correlation with gasoline’s 
price. 
Finally, as the BRICS contains oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, the analysis will be 
at the country level which preserves every country’s specifications. 
 
3.2 Unit root and cointegration tests 
To test for stochastic stationarity, and following the confirmatory data analysis process, both 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and KPSS tests were employed*. All the variables turned 
out to be stationary by differencing in the first level.
The optimal lag length was selected through the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion 
(SBIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) 
                                                          
* The results are available in the online appendix 
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(Table 1). Following the finding of Lutkephol (2005) who demonstrated that SBIC procures an 
appropriate estimation of the actual lag order, it was selected when results were heterogeneous. 
 
Table 1: Order Criteria Selection 
 
 
3.3 VAR model  
 
The VAR (p) model used is the following (based on Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005): 
𝑌𝑡             = 𝐶  +  ∑    𝐴𝑖     𝑌𝑡−𝑖 +    𝜀𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1    (1) 
[𝑁 ∗ 1]    [𝑁 ∗ 1]         [𝑁 ∗ 𝑁]            [𝑁 ∗ 1] 
     
    𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜀𝑖) = Ω = 𝑈𝑈
𝑇 , the Cholesky decomposition 
 
After checking for the coefficients significance with the Wald test, it is informative to employ 
the Granger causality test in order to confirm on which variables oil prices changes have a 
direct impact. 
The ordering has been made according to the previous literature, namely the baseline model of 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005: total industrial production (TIP), nominal oil prices 
(OilP), CPI, interest rates (IR), unemployment rates (UR), exchange rates (EXR), exports (EXP) 
and imports (IMP). The latter ordering is explained by earlier studies which presume that GDP 
does not respond collectively to the other macroeconomic variables. Oil prices are arranged in 
the way that it has effect on inflation, which would have a contemporaneous effect on the 
following variables (Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). 
 
Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
AIC 2 -25.8811 4 -23.6099 2 -27.7056 2 -21.5198 2 -20.7172 
HQIC 1 -24.4113 1 -22.5838 1 -27.3213 1 -20.7224 1 -20.1158 
SBIC 1 -24.7787 1 -21.5120 1 -26.8292 1 -19.8865 1 -19.6238 
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For robustness, another order has been tested: IR, TIP, UR, EXR, OilP, CPI, EXP and IMP. 
This is explained by the effect of IR on GDP, and by the argument that oil is a production input. 
No differences were noticed when comparing the results of the two different orders. 
It is also important to mention that all VARs satisfied stability conditions and all eigenvalues 
lie inside the unit circle. The normality test was rejected for all countries. However, it is argued 
that normality is not a necessity when it comes to the “validity of statistical procedures related 
to the VAR” (Lutkepohl, 2001). 
 
3.4 Asymmetric non-linear model:  
While the linear VAR model assumes that the oil price impact is symmetric, a non-linear 
transformation permits to observe how an increase varies from a decrease of a similar 
magnitude (Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). This study followed Iwayemi and 
Fowowe (2011); with an adjustment added by Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005), based 
on Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995). The model consists in extracting the conditional variance of oil 
price fluctuations. The transformation of oil prices through a GARCH (2, 2) as seen in Table 
2. This allowed for two new variables: scaled oil prices increase (SOPI) and scaled oil prices 
decrease (SOPD). 
 
 
Table 2: GARCH Information Criteria 
Lag HQIC SBIC 
0 2.16938 2.17814 
1 -2.13774 -2.12022 
2 -2.19689* -2.17061* 
3 -2.18647 -2.15143 
4 -2.17225 -2.12844 
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 Model Specification: 
𝑜𝑡 =  𝛿 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 𝑜𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1   (2) 
𝜀𝑡 =  𝑣𝑡√ℎ𝑡  ~  𝑁(0,1)   (3) 
ℎ𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝜀
2
𝑡−1 +  𝛾2ℎ𝑡−1  (4) 
𝑆𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑡 = max (0,
𝜀𝑡
√ℎ𝑡
)    (5) 
𝑆𝑂𝑃𝐷𝑡 = min (0,
𝜀𝑡
√ℎ𝑡
)   (6) 
 
Those two latter were included then within a standard VAR model for a Granger causality 
test, an impulse response function and a variance decomposition in order to compare the 
findings with the first model. 
 
4 Analysis and findings: 
 
4.1 Brazil: 
 
After fitting the VAR model, running the Wald test for every equation and all the VAR 
equations jointly is of interest. The null hypothesis of the endogenous variables being zero 
jointly at specific lags is rejected for all the equations. Since the optimal lag length for Brazil 
is 1 according to SBIC and HQIC, the results will be restricted then to one lag.  
 
Granger Causality Test 
The Granger causality test reveals that oil prices changes have an effective impact on total 
industrial production, inflation, unemployment rates, exports and imports. With regards to 
scaled oil price increases and decreases, total industrial production is highlighted, as it is likely 
Granger-caused by both scaled oil prices increases and decreases. Furthermore, scaled oil price 
increases Granger-cause exports and imports, whereas scaled oil price decreases Granger-cause 
unemployment. 
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Table 3: Granger Causality Test-Brazil 
H0  𝝒𝟐 DF P > 𝝒𝟐 
TIP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 21.157 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil+ 22.671 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 4.9703 2 0.083* 
CPI is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 7.0805 2 0.029** 
S.Oil+ 4.3111 2 0.116 
S.Oil- 4.0865 2 0.130 
IR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 0.0097 2 0.995 
S.Oil+ 0.22552 2 0.893 
S.Oil- 0.24955 2 0.883 
UR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 8.1692 2 0.017** 
S.Oil+ 0.2.0727 2 0.355 
S.Oil- 21.612 2 0.000*** 
ExR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 2.6326 2 0.268 
S.Oil+ 3.949 2 0.139 
S.Oil- 0.61249 2 0.736 
EXP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 8.8535 2 0.012** 
S.Oil+ 13.377 2 0.001*** 
S.Oil- 0.49359 2 0.781 
IMP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 14.753 2 0.001*** 
S.Oil+ 8.4351 2 0.015** 
S.Oil- 7.1433 2 0.028** 
*, ** and *** denote significance for 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 
Impulse Response Function:  
The results of impulse Response Functions are reported below. Clearly, it confirmed the 
findings of the previous Granger causality test, but it also revealed the magnitude of an oil 
price shock.  
As it can be seen in Figure 1.1, a 100% standard deviation of oil prices increases total industrial 
production by 7% the following month and the impact decreases steadily until it almost dies 
away after a year. A similar response is experienced by inflation as well as exports and imports. 
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However, imports saw more fluctuations, with a 29% increase the 2nd month, a drop of 6% 
followed by a 4.8% increase until the shock impact disappears.  
Following the Granger causality test which was insignificant with regards to interest rates and 
exchange rates, both confidence intervals looked insignificant as well. However, it seems that 
an oil price shock has a negative impact on those latter. Exchange rates response shows 
oscillations for four months before the shock dies out.  
Generally, inflation, total industrial production, interest rates, exports and imports witnessed a 
positive response to an oil price shock. By contrast, unemployment rates and exchange rates 
show negative responses. 
 
Figure1: Impulse response functions – Brazil 
1.1: Oil price variation 
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The second block of IRF graphs illustrate the responses of the variables subject to scaled oil 
price increases (SOPI) and decreases (SOPD). Although scaled oil price increases did not have 
a direct impact on inflation, a negative shock led to a 2% increase. An increase of a smaller 
magnitude was noticed when the shock was positive. Interest rates followed most likely due to 
the inflationary pressure as it will be explained below. Unemployment rates responded 
negatively when scaled oil prices shock was negative, and positively with positive shocks. As 
aforementioned, total industrial production responds positively to both positive and negative 
shocks, even though the positive shock yields a higher response.   
The response of both imports and exports was close to one another with regards to positive 
shocks. The negative shock, however, led to opposite responses: imports increased the second 
month and then decreased while the exports decreased then increased. Those responses may 
have been associated to exchange rates variations, where a negative shock led to a positive 
response and vice versa. 
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1.2 Scaled Oil prices decreases and increases. 
    
    
   
 
 
 
  
 
14 
 
Variance Decomposition  
Table 4 reports that up to 6.44% of total industrial production volatility is explained by oil price 
shocks in the year. Moreover, oil price volatility contributes by up to 1.4% in the forecasted 
error variance of inflation, by 3.8% with regards to unemployment rates, 4% for exports and 
almost 5% for imports. 
  
Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD)-Brazil: ∆OilP 
 
 
 
 
 
Only total industrial production was explained by its own innovations in the first month. 
Conforming to the results of previous subsections, insignificant findings were found regarding 
interest rates (only 0.68%). However, 2.7% of exchange rate volatility was explained by oil 
price volatility. 
Tables 5 and 6 of variance decomposition show that scaled oil price increases account for more 
than scaled oil price decreases for all the variables: SOPI explain 8.6 % of TIP volatility 
compared to 0.7% explained by SOPD. With regards to inflation, 0.9 % of CPI volatility is due 
to SOPI where 2.5% is due to SOPD. Regarding exports and imports, 5% and 3% of the 
variations were related to SOPI, and 0.5% and 2.8% to SOPD respectively. 
 
 
Table 5: FEVD-Brazil: S.Oil+ 
S.Oil+ 
TIP CPI IR UR ExR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.000014 0.00039 0.007171 0.033668 0.008622 0.000665 
4 0.082496 0.00785 0.000755 0.009327 0.060308 0.048954 0.028192 
8 0.086603 0.009349 0.000894 0.009835 0.061029 0.05418 0.029466 
12 0.086642 0.00972 0.000923 0.009865 0.061027 0.050439 0.029483 
∆OilP 
TIP CPI IR UR ExR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.023832 0.006222 0.000176 0.009136 0.010768 0.001696 
4 0.064432 0.014451 0.006866 0.037519 0.027419 0.039628 0.050782 
8 0.06443 0.013537 0.00688 0.037802 0.027539 0.03981 0.051754 
12 0.064433 0.013506 0.00688 0.037804 0.027537 0.03981 0.051753 
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Table 6: FEVD-Brazil: S.Oil- 
S.Oil- 
TIP CPI IR UR ExR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.045887 0.007513 0.004321 0.002917 0.001924 0.00105 
4 0.00633 0.025653 0.010314 0.074653 0.00413 0.005055 0.02791 
8 0.00688 0.024873 0.010354 0.074432 0.004201 0.005147 0.028352 
12 0.006884 0.024813 0.010362 0.07443 0.004203 0.005152 0.028352 
 
 
Discussion  
Remarkably, interest rates are not likely to be affected either by oil price changes or by positive 
shocks. This might be due to the excessive Brazilian interest rates. According to the IMF (2012), 
Brazil has considerably elevated interest rates since 1980 due to hyperinflation and low saving 
rates. Notwithstanding its substantial decrease from 1994, the rates are still higher than the 
other developing countries reaching 40% in 1995 (IMF, 2012). This may explain the reason 
why the Granger-causality is not significant in terms of interest rates.  Exchange rates seem to 
be linked to interest rates. In fact, the central bank opted for an inflation targeting policy; but 
has deviated from the “floating exchange rate” regime adopted in 1999 through regular 
interventions of dollar purchases (Tobal and Yslas, 2016). 
Manifestly, oil price shocks do not seem to have an expected decisive macroeconomic impact 
on Brazil. Those results may be explained by the considerable decline in oil dependence 
(Cavalcanti and Jalles, 2013). In parallel, Brazil set a long-term target of maximising its oil 
production. This led to a 36% increase in oil exports in 2015 (EIA, 2015) and allowed to less 
vulnerability to oil prices fluctuation. 
In line with previous findings, Cavalcanti and Jalles (2013) found that oil price volatility could 
explain only a limited proportion of inflation or total industrial production volatilities. They 
also confirmed the impact of negative oil variations, in increasing unemployment and reducing 
consumption and demand, matching with what this paper found in terms of direct impact on 
unemployment rates, inflation and interest rates 
However, as inflation has experienced the same response following both scaled oil prices 
increases and decreases, one might look at the rationale behind this outcome. In fact, according 
to Farzanegan and Marwardt (2009), the inflation response may rely heavily on oil revenues.  
Thus, following an oil price increase, the government enjoys higher foreign reserves. 
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Meanwhile, import volume expands as Brazil still imports significant volumes of petroleum 
products (ΕΙΑ, 2015), and domestic production would increase. Those movements would lead 
to higher inflation (Farzanegan and Marwardt, 2009). Analogously, international oil price 
decreases would reduce foreign reserves and cause currency depreciation as oil exports 
represent almost 10% of total Brazilian exports (UN Comtrade, 2014). This generates higher 
import prices and more expensive foreign products. As a result, total industrial production 
would witness a decrease while potentially explaining the increase in prices (Farzanegan and 
Marwardt, 2009). The impact of scaled oil prices movements seems thus indirect, which 
corroborates the outcomes of the Granger causality test. 
 
 
4.2 Russia  
According to the VAR results, oil prices impact positively on total industrial production, 
exports and imports, but negatively on inflation rates, interest rates, unemployment rates and 
exchange rates. The Wald test revealed that all the endogenous variables at lag 1 are jointly 
significant for each equation and for all the equations. 
 
Granger Causality Test: 
The Granger causality test results are reported in Table 7 below. The conclusion drawn from 
this test is that oil prices changes are Granger-causing total industrial production, interest rates, 
as well as imports and exports. Insignificant results are reported regarding inflation, 
unemployment rates and exchange rates. 
The Granger causality test showed similar results. Both negative and positive changes are 
significant in terms of total production, interest rates, exports and imports whereas only positive 
oil price shocks had a direct impact on unemployment rates. On the other hand, no Granger 
Causality was noticed for inflation and exchange rates. This result is surprising apropos of 
inflation. As Russia is considered the world’s largest crude oil producer (EIA, 2015), it was 
expected to see a Granger-causality of oil prices.  
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Table 7: Granger causality Test-Russia  
H0   𝝒𝟐 P > 𝝒𝟐 P > 𝝒𝟐 
TIP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 16.701 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil+ 14.079 2 0.001*** 
S.Oil- 5.9689 2 0.051* 
CPI is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 1.6672 2 0.434 
S.Oil+ 0.65777 2 0.720 
S.Oil- 1.3386 2 0.512 
IR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 14.337 2 0.001*** 
S.Oil+ 4.5956 2 0.1* 
S.Oil- 13.328 2 0.001*** 
UR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 0.87893 2 0.644 
S.Oil+ 5.6914 2 0.058** 
S.Oil- 1.0696 2 0.586 
ExR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 3.2208 2 0.200 
S.Oil+ 2.105 2 0.349 
S.Oil- 1.5588 2 0.459 
EXP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 57.255 2 0.000 *** 
S.Oil+ 51.083 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 17.945 2 0.000*** 
IMP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 15.98 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil+ 11.958 2 0.003*** 
S.Oil- 7.3619 2 0.025** 
*, ** and *** denote significance for 10%, 5% and 1% respectively   
 
 
 Impulse Response Function: 
The variables’ responses corroborate the VAR outcomes. An increase of 8% in total industrial 
production was witnessed followed by an oscillation until the shock dies away after 6 months. 
Exports showed a dramatic jump of 48.8% and the impact decreases steadily until the 10th 
month. Similarly, imports’ response showed a rise of 26% which dropped gradually until the 
6th month. On the other hand, inflation rate’s response remains negative, and the effect seems 
to disappear only a year after.  
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Figure 2: IRFs- Russia 
2.1: O Oil prices variation 
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A sharper drop characterised unemployment rates, reaching 11.5% three months later after 
which a recovery started. Interest rates and exchange rates responses had a similar response: a 
decrease of 11% and 6.2% respectively in the 1st month. 
With regards to scaled oil prices increases, only total industrial production, imports and exports 
responded positively. A negative response was associated with inflation rates, interest rates, 
unemployment rates and exchange rates. The responses of the variables were similar following 
a scaled oil price decrease except for unemployment rates, which saw a decrease in the 1st 
month. When comparing the magnitude of the shocks, negative shocks were followed by a 
higher response in terms of inflation and interest rates, whereas positive scaled oil price shocks 
characterised the responses of  total industrial production, exchange rates, exports and imports.  
 
2.2: Scaled Oil prices decreases and increases 
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Variance Decomposition: 
According to Table 8 presented below, an oil price shock accounts for 8% of total industrial 
production variance, which confirms the findings above. It also accounts for 9.3% of export 
variance. 
Regarding unemployment rates, exchange rates and imports, oil shocks explained between 
3.5% and 5.5% of their variation. This impact was less pronounced in terms of inflation and 
interest rates, with 1.5% and 1.2% respectively of variance explained by oil price volatility.   
The conclusion from the variance decomposition of both SOPI and SOPD is that the positive 
oil shocks account for more than the negative shock for all variables. The exception comes 
with regards to interest rates, where the proportion is minimal (1.4% for SCOD compared to 
1.1% for SOPI). 
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Table 8: FEVD-Russia: ∆Oil 
∆Oil TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP   IMP 
        
1 0 .010182 .000176 .001324 .000016 .03095 .009958 
4 0.079819 .011376 .012073 .03411 .033106 .093343 .037292 
8 0.079809 .014941 .012639 .053098 .036363 .093463 .03812 
12 0.079818 .015642 .01278 .054964 .036377 .093462   .038151 
 
 
Table 9: FEVD-Russia: S.Oil+ 
S.Oil+ TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP   IMP 
        
1 0 0.008298 0.005633 0.001257 0.00222 0.0026 0.006513 
4 0.064964 0.008793 0.010671 0.075082 0.035604 0.087492 0.036226 
8 0.065368 0.013086 0.011007 0.130444 0.040695 0.090089 0.038542 
12 0.065415 0.01437 0.011365 0.13525 0.040787 0.09011 0.03858 
 
 
Table 10: FEVD-Russia: S.Oil- 
S.Oil- TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP   IMP 
        
1 0 0.002108 0.001899 0.000156 0.00162 0.032604 0.004735 
4 0.02267 0.003436 0.013772 0.003967 0.007528 0.027354 0.01038 
8 0.022989 0.003617 0.014011 0.003746 0.007641 0.026851 0.010487 
12 0.022985 0.003631 0.013991 0.003725 0.007636 0.026838 0.010487 
 
 
Discussion  
Those results, especially the ones regarding total industrial production and exports are related 
to the large dependence of the Russian economy on crude oil (EIA, 2017). The accentuated 
significance regarding the latter two variables are mainly due to the elevated production of 
oil. In fact, the Russian economy is dominated by oil and natural gas exports (EIA, 2015), 
and the energy exports account for 70% of the total Russian exports (UN Comtrade, 2014). 
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This  outcome corroborates the findings of Izatov (2015), who highlighted the considerable 
impact of oil prices on the Russian GDP. Besides, the heavy impact on imports is most likely 
due to the goods imported by Russia, where 35% of total imports are industrial and electrical 
machineries and plastics products (UN Comtrade, 2014), usually depending on and related to 
oil, which should affect their prices. 
Interestingly, neither inflation nor exchange rates were significant with the Granger causality 
test. This might be explained by the focus on exchange rate stability (Central Bank of Russia, 
2016) involving extensive money supply changes to counter Ruble appreciation, which led to 
high inflation rates up to 2008. Since then, Russia has adopted an inflation targeting regime 
to monitor price stability. A floating exchange rate regime was gradually implemented until 
November 2014 (Central Bank of Russia, 2016), so that both inflation and exchange rates 
have been under full government control. Moreover, and as argued by Leduc and Sill (2003), 
total industrial production and inflation tend to be less vulnerable to oil price variation when 
the policy framework aims at price stability. The findings of this paper are in alignment with 
Izatov’s (2015) outcomes. The results of this latter confirm the “anti-inflation policy”. This 
policy exerts an important control over currency depreciation to prevent a loss of value of the 
Ruble. 
With regards to interest rates, subject to a direct impact of both scaled oil prices increases and 
decreases, the impact could be explained through the liquidity expansion needed when 
international oil prices go up. This leads to a drop in nominal interest rates (Hamilton, 2001); 
and the inflationary pressures which heighten when oil prices decline.  
A point worth mentioning is that Russia has been subject to several financial and trade 
sanctions by the United States and the European Union, resulting in confidence loss in the 
Russian economy (World Bank, 2015; EIA, 2015). Apart from the currency depreciation 
which pressured inflation, this may have affected unemployment rates; firms were in 
difficulties especially with regards to new project financing; trade, consumption and 
investment were affected (WB, 2015).  
 
4.3 India 
The conclusion drawn from the VAR is that oil price changes have a significant positive effect 
on Indian total industrial production, inflation, exports and imports. Insignificant positive 
impact was noticed on both interest and exchange rates. Lagrange-multiplier test revealed no 
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autocorrelation at the lag order, and conducting the Wald test confirmed the significance of all 
the endogenous variables for each equation and for all the equations at the lag order selected. 
 
Granger Causality test: 
The Granger causality test showed that oil price variation has a causal impact only on inflation, 
exports and imports. No Granger-causality relationship was revealed concerning total 
industrial production, interest rates or exchange rates. With regard to the asymmetric model, 
only oil prices increases Granger-cause exports. Both movements have a direct impact on 
inflation and imports. 
 
Table 11: Granger Causality- India 
H0  𝝒𝟐 DF P > 𝝒𝟐 
 
TIP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 2.8929 2 0.235 
S.Oil+ 1.9293 2 0.381 
S.Oil- 1.5728 2 0.455 
CPI is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 9.9572 2 0.007*** 
S.Oil+ 5.2374 2 0.073* 
S.Oil- 6.2386 2 0.044** 
IR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 1.2368 2 0.539 
S.Oil+ 0.71484 2 0.699 
S.Oil- 1.5561 2 0.459 
ExR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 1.2629 2 0.532 
S.Oil+ 0.46951 2 0.791 
S.Oil- 1.9476 2 0.378 
EXP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 18.863 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil+ 23.951 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 2.3684 2 0.306 
IMP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 45.428 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil+ 44.13 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 12.624 2 0.002** 
*, ** and *** denote significance for 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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 Impulse response function: 
Conforming to the results obtained from the previous section, a first look at the impulse 
responses shows the insignificance of the confidence intervals of total industrial production, 
interest rates and exchange rates. 
 
Figure 3: IRFs – India 
3.1: Oil prices variations 
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3.2: Scaled oil prices decreases and increases  
    
   
  
 
More closely, an oil price shock leads to an initial increase of 2.4% in total industrial 
production, which dies away 8 months later after three oscillations. Interest rate responses 
seem of a higher magnitude as 100% oil prices standard deviation led to 101% jump, most 
likely affected by the rise in economic activity. On the other hand, only a 0.64% rise was seen 
in terms of exchange rates in the first month and the impact disappeared from the 5th month. 
The inflation response was an 11.6% increase after which it decreases until the 5th month. In 
like manner, both imports and exports expressed a sharp rise of 20% and 38% respectively. 
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Although exports response remains positive until it reduced to zero, imports response became 
negative in the 4th month, and their responses were statistically significant for the first month. 
Turning to the SOPI shocks, an increase was experienced in the first period for all the variables 
except exchange rates. The SOPD led to a similar response, but of a smaller magnitude.  
 
Variance Decomposition: 
The results of Cholesky variance decomposition are presented in table 12, 13 and 14 below. 
According to FEVD tables, oil prices changes could explain roughly 0.5 to 2.5 % of total 
industrial production, interest rates and exchange rates volatilities.   
Moreover, oil prices variations contributed a moderate proportion of 5.4% in explaining 
inflation variations. 5 % of exports and 11% of imports variances were due to oil prices 
fluctuations. 
 
Table 12: FEVD-India: ∆Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: FEVD-India: S.Oil+ 
S.Oil+ TIP CPI IR EXR EXP IMP 
       
1 0 0.0007 0.002482 0.042588 0.018574 0.034558 
4 0.018632 0.029309 0.008237 0.038491 0.056892 0.082171 
8 0.021716 0.031896 0.008428 0.038652 0.059192 0.087711 
12 0.021746 0.031915 0.008431 0.03866 0.059215 0.087744 
∆Oil TIP CPI IR EXR EXP IMP 
       
1 0 0.000982 0.000609 0.017885 0.020405 0.034773 
4 0.02303
5 
0.053477 0.00486 0.017423 0.048466 0.106425 
8 0.02515 0.054415 0.00531 0.017507 0.049127 0.107951 
12 0.02515 0.054415 0.005318 0.017509 0.04913 0.107954 
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On the other hand, SOPD could explain about 3% and 0.8% of the latter variables and SOPI 
accounted for approximately 6% and 8.8% of their variations. 
SOPI variations were responsible for 2 to 4 % of inflation, total industrial production, and 
exchange rates variance, while SOPD has a smaller portion of 3%, 0.9% and 0.6% respectively. 
 
Table 14: FEVD-India: S.Oil- 
S.Oil- TIP CPI IR EXR EXP IMP 
       
1 0 0.005263 0.000179 0.000365 0.001052 0.002566 
4 0.008389 0.031489 0.006739 0.005923 0.008085 0.030794 
8 0.009003 0.031507 0.007129 0.006029 0.008248 0.030543 
12 0.009006 0.031507 0.007132 0.00603 0.008247 0.030541 
 
 
Discussion:  
Regarding inflation, it seems that the results found herein corroborate the theory, such as Rafiq 
and Salim (2014)’s paper. According to the EIA (2016), the drop in international oil prices has 
been advantageous for the Indian economy especially with regards to government spending. 
Analogously, Jain and Pail (2015) asserted that numerous oil related products as “liquefied 
petroleum gas” and “fertilisers” represent a heavy charge, thus weakening investment and 
economic growth. Sharma et al. (2012) assert that the government was taking serious reforms 
to switch into other sustainable options such as biomass and hydroelectric or nuclear energies. 
This may explain the insignificant impact of oil on total industrial production especially that 
India has substantial coal reserves. Notably, the coal sector has been experiencing a large 
development since the late nineties (EIA, 2016). Another noteworthy reflection is the equity 
purchase the Indian National Oil Companies have made overseas, principally in South 
American and African oil companies (EIA, 2016; Inter-American Development Bank, 2015). 
This investment allowed an access to the natural resources as well as production effectiveness. 
A further reason for oil prices changes being partially prevalent on the Indian economy is its 
expanded services sector from which the largest economic development comes (IMF, 2005). 
This not only accredited for less vulnerability and exposure to oil prices shocks but also shaped 
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the exports structure relying mainly on the sophisticated Indian products. More clearly, it is 
believed that both pharmaceutical and IT sectors are the main contributors to the economic 
development (Nassif, 2007); in comparison with agriculture or manufacturing, a sector which 
requires high energy sufficiency.  
Eventually, and with regards to the monetary regime adopted, India opted for a floating regime 
where the Reserve Bank of India has an active intervention to limit exchange rate volatility. 
This was more noticeable from 2000, where the rupee was almost the only unaffected currency 
remaining stable despite the high volatility for the other currencies (Joshi and Sanyal, 2004). 
Moreover, India is following a “multi-indicator monetary policy” with price stability a priority 
(Reserve Bank of India, 2016), which implies that theoretically, the oil shock would not show 
an impact on inflation, but would affect trade balance and GDP.  
Note that few researchers have focused on the macroeconomic impact of oil prices changes in 
India. They tended to commonly focus on the stock market such as Fang and You (2014), 
Ghosh and Kinjilal (2016), most likely due to the limited availability of macroeconomic data 
for high frequencies. 
 
4.4 China  
The VAR outcomes showed a significant positive relationship between oil prices and Chinese 
industrial production, inflation, interest rates, exports and imports, whereas it showed a 
negative relationship with unemployment and exchange rates. At 5% significance level, no 
autocorrelation was observed at the lag order 1, and the Wald test confirmed that all the 
endogenous variables at lag 1 are jointly significant for each equation and for all the equations 
(at 1% for all except of exchange rates, significant only at 10%). 
 
Granger Causality test: 
As shown in Table 15, Granger-causality was significant in terms of total industrial 
production, unemployment rates, exports and imports. This impact was foreseen as China is 
the largest energy consumer worldwide (EIA, 2015). No causal relationship was significant in 
terms of interest rates or exchange rates. Moreover, while oil prices changes, in general, did 
not Granger-cause inflation, it seems that both scaled oil prices increases and decreases do 
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have a direct impact. Unemployment rates experience the same direct impact from both 
scaled price movements. Exports and imports turned out to be Granger-caused by oil price 
increases. 
 
Table 1: Granger Causality Test- China 
H0  𝝒𝟐 DF P > 𝝒𝟐 
TIP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 5.073 2 0.079* 
S.Oil+ 4.3787 2 0.112 
S.Oil- 0.5855 2 0.746 
CPI is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 3.3991 2 0.183 
S.Oil+ 5.0059 2 0.082*  
S.Oil- 9.7865 2 0.007***  
IR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 0.3734 2 0.830 
S.Oil+ 0.30635 2 0.858  
S.Oil- 1.2206 2 0.543  
UR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 7.2994 2 0.026** 
S.Oil+ 7.0245 2 0.030** 
S.Oil- 5.4463 2 0.066*  
ExR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 1.0169 2 0.601 
S.Oil+ 1.9886 2 0.370 
S.Oil- 0.88555 2 0.642 
EXP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 32.219 2 0.000 *** 
S.Oil+ 41.615 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 1.7366 2 0.420  
IMP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 56.046 2 0.000 *** 
S.Oil+ 70.308 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 0.95994 2 0.619 
*, ** and *** denote significance for 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
  
 
 
Impulse response function: 
The IRFs were in accordance with the previous section outcomes through confidence 
interval examination. As it can be seen from Figure 4.1, one oil price shock increased 
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total industrial production by 4%. The impact on exports and imports was of a higher 
weight, reaching 36 % and 47 % for the first month, respectively. All those variables 
fluctuated for approximately 10 months until the shock gradually disappears. 
Unemployment rates witnessed an opposite response with a considerable drop of 40% in 
the second month. Although not statistically significant, the IRFs showed that oil price 
volatility caused an increase in interest rates as well as a 51% increase in inflation rates, 
and depreciation of exchange rates. 
On the other hand, SOPI led to positive responses for TIP, CPI, interest rates, exports 
and imports. Comparably, SOPD were followed by positive responses for total industrial 
production, inflation and exchange rates. Interest rates, exports and imports showed 
negative responses the first month. 
 
Figure 4: IRFS-China 
4.1: Oil prices variations 
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4.2: Scaled oil prices decreases and increases 
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Variance Decomposition: 
The volatilities that showed the highest sensitivity with regards to oil prices volatility 
were, as in the previous sections, exports, imports and unemployment rates. In fact, oil 
prices were a sizeable source of volatility with a contribution of almost 15 % in imports 
variations, and around 8% for the two first variables. 
 
Table 2: FEVD- China: ∆Oil 
 
∆Oil TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.032172 0.003701 0.004889 0.0029 0.003243 0.001948 
4 0.019244 0.064132 0.020795 0.071994 0.016425 0.07284 0.140235 
8 0.021324 0.064931 0.021894 0.079931 0.018068 0.07583 0.147917 
12 0.021338 0.064972 0.022133 0.080183 0.018216 0.075849 0.147958 
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The unpredictable outcome was in terms of total industrial production, as only 2% of its 
volatility was due to oil price changes. The remaining results did not differ from the earlier 
findings, and oil prices deviation explained 6.5% of both CPI, and 1.8 % of the exchange rates 
variability. 
The variance decomposition of both SOPI (Table 17) and SOPD (Table 18) revealed that 
positive oil shocks account for more than negative shocks do for all the variables. The portion 
of scaled oil price decreases is low for total industrial production, interest rates, exchange rates, 
exports and imports; while scaled oil prices increases range between 1.5% and 4.3 % for total 
industrial production, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. The highest contribution of 
SOPI was in terms of unemployment rates, exports and imports (9.3%, 12.8% and 16.9% 
respectively). 
 
Table 3: FEVD- China: S.Oil+ 
S.Oil+ TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.038618 0.000315 0.002547 0.002589 0.005162 0.007551 
4 0.025194 0.043113 0.01387 0.08466 0.024034 0.124519 0.165826 
8 0.028635 0.043273 0.014968 0.093149 0.025644 0.128284 0.169623 
12 0.02866 0.043314 0.015172 0.093443 0.025859 0.128341 0.169467 
 
 
Table 4: FEVD- China: S.Oil- 
S.Oil- TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.009048 0.003549 0.000484 1.9E-07 0.019672 0.001317 
4 0.001896 0.070586 0.021668 0.019235 0.003678 0.024891 0.010056 
8 0.002311 0.070639 0.021481 0.018983 0.004149 0.024598 0.011781 
12 0.00232 0.070628 0.021508 0.018968 0.004169 0.024651 0.011889 
 
Discussion  
Firstly, those results were in accordance with what Du, He and Wei (2010) found regarding the 
economic growth and the non-linear impact. It is also in agreement with Rafiq and Salim (2014) 
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where oil prices volatility did not have any direct impact on Chinese inflation but was 
significant in terms of GDP. Similarly, Faria et al. (2009) confirmed the positive relationship 
between oil prices and exports. 
To better analyse the findings of this paper, one might look at the macroeconomic regime 
adopted by China. The policy framework aimed to protect the national currency from 
fluctuations against the US dollar by adopting the fixed exchange rate regime until 2005 
(Sadeghian, White and D’Arcy, 2013). Although China switched to a floating exchange regime, 
a control was exerted on the currency for two years to counter the substantial exports decrease 
due to the financial crisis. This not only might have protected exchange rates from any oil 
prices influence but also led to a better control of inflation as argued by Gosh et al. (1997) and 
Suranovic (2005). The two papers suggested that pegged exchange rate regimes were strongly 
linked with improved inflation performance. Regarding fiscal policy, the Chinese government 
imposed taxes on the consumption of oil in order to “rationalise consumption” (Fattouh et al., 
2015) and lower the oil dependency. Huang and Guo (2007) found that both lower dependence 
on imported oil and rigid regulation were the reason for the negligible impact of oil prices. 
As one might expect, total industrial production is negatively correlated with oil prices, Faria 
et al. (2009) argued that the rationale behind this relationship is the high competitiveness of 
China. Conceivably, it is likely that China is able to convert oil needs to a labour need in the 
production function (with labour and oil as inputs), which augments both productivity and 
boost exports (Faria et al., 2009). Specifically, they argue that the boost in exports is explained 
by an increase in the “relative labour productivity”  and the important labour surplus, and  this 
plays a role in increasing oil prices. The latter claim leads to an elementary justification of Du, 
He and Wei (2010), who claimed that the high volume of Chinese exports might have impacted 
the international oil prices. Although China’s oil production satisfies almost all national needs 
in the domestic market (EIA, 2015), this claim may hold as China is the largest worldwide 
exporter of goods (EIA, 2015); a key position China has in the international trade market which 
may allow it to act upon international oil prices. 
 
4.4 South Africa 
A first look at the VAR outcomes revealed a statistically significant positive relationship 
between oil price fluctuations and total industrial production, as well as inflation, imports and 
exports. A negative relationship characterised interest rates, unemployment rates, and 
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exchange rates.  The Wald test turned out to be significant for all the variables at 5% except 
exchange rates which was significant only at 10%. Further, no autocorrelation at lag order was 
noticed. 
 
 Granger Causality test: 
As predicted, the Granger-causality test exhibits significant outcomes for all the variables apart 
from interest rates and unemployment rates.  
 
Table 19: Granger Causality Test- South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H0  𝝒𝟐 DF P > 𝝒𝟐 
TIP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 3.5233 2 0.061* 
S.Oil+ 12.673 2 0.002*** 
S.Oil- 0.646 2 0.724 
CPI is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 15.763 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil+ 33.532 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 2.8106 2 0.245  
IR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 0.4188 2 0.518 
S.Oil+ 0.90792 2 0.635 
S.Oil- 1.4709 2 0.479 
UR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 0.06384 2 0.801 
S.Oil+ 1.6934 2 0.429 
S.Oil- 1.4439 2 0.486 
ExR is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 3.9027 2 0.048** 
S.Oil+ 4.5158 2 0.105  
S.Oil- 1.6456 2 0.439  
EXP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 8.7576 2 0.003 *** 
S.Oil+ 14.477 2 0.001*** 
S.Oil- 13.346 2 0.001*** 
IMP is not Granger-caused by ∆Oil 3.3998 2 0.065* 
S.Oil+ 20.339 2 0.000*** 
S.Oil- 5.7276 2 0.057* 
*, ** and *** denote significance for 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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At the 99% confidence level, oil Granger-causes inflation and exports. This causality holds at 
95% level for exchange rates and total industrial production, and at 10% in terms of imports.   
Similar results were obtained with regards to SOPI. However, SOPD did not exhibit any direct 
impact on any of the variables except of imports. 
 
 Impulse response function: 
 
Figure 5: IRFs- South Africa 
5.1 Oil prices variations:  
    
  
    
  
 
37 
 
 
 
The IRFs verified the VAR’s results. A 100% standard deviation of oil prices increased total 
industrial production by 4% and needed 6 months to die away. It has a similar impact on exports 
and imports, but with a higher magnitude, with approximately 23% and 30% increase 
respectively. Imports displayed a longer sensitivity as the shock did not fade away until the 8th 
month.  Only 0.9% increase was associated with inflation response the first month, after which 
it gradually lessens. On the other hand, an oil price shock led to a 12% decline in terms of 
exchange rates, with a quick offset afterwards. Lastly, and although statistically insignificant, 
interest rates response exhibited a 16% increase the first month, disappearing after the 3rd 
month. 
5.2: Scaled oil prices decreases and increases:
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Variance Decomposition: 
According to Table 20, 3.6% of the volatility of total industrial production is explained by the 
oil price volatility. A smaller proportion of 2% explains the variation of inflation. Exports  and 
exchange rates had a higher proportion of volatility accounting for by oil prices (8.5% and 8% 
respectively). In terms of import volatility, around 7% were due to the oil prices variance, 
whilst the latter accounted for more than 5% of unemployment rates. Comparatively, only a 
contribution of 0.2 % was associated with oil prices for interest rates. 
 
Table 20: FEVD South Africa: ∆Oil 
 
∆Oil TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.06179 0.002982 0.051521 0.065835 0.011067 0.031565 
4 0.035066 0.196622 0.002781 0.053297 0.078934 0.08251 0.066027 
8 0.035671 0.205922 0.002777 0.053982 0.080532 0.085086 0.068632 
12 0.035695 0.206141 0.002777 0.054014 0.080585 0.085168 0.068711 
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Except for interest rates and unemployment rates, scaled oil prices increases explained the 
variance of the variables more than scaled oil prices decreases. The latter accounts for a small 
portion in the explanation of the variation of the variables under analysis. 
 
Table 21: FEVD South Africa: S.Oil+ 
S.Oil+ TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.006206 0.002569 0.022126 0.084597 0.01141 0.002704 
4 0.062863 0.224868 0.003264 0.038784 0.102409 0.144223 0.089971 
8 0.06715 0.212177 0.005055 0.039815 0.100986 0.129902 0.090234 
12 0.067111 0.211277 0.005221 0.040078 0.100856 0.129076 0.089943 
 
 
Table 22: FEVD South Africa: S.Oil- 
S.Oil- TIP CPI IR UR EXR EXP IMP 
        
1 0 0.034322 0.000955 0.024298 0.106272 0.00059 0.000227 
4 0.011724 0.045734 0.026259 0.0223 0.116496 0.094577 0.099645 
8 0.011983 0.051352 0.039044 0.029931 0.115356 0.131351 0.110966 
12 0.012011 0.052845 0.039279 0.030171 .0116115 0.134329 0.112725 
 
 
Discussion  
Firstly, the outcomes are likely to be foreseen since South Africa is not only the largest 
African energy consumer but also the second highest oil consumer in the African continent 
(EIA, 2015). This paper’s findings are consistent with previous studies. Clearly, Kin and 
Courage (2014) asserted the significant effect of oil prices on South African exchange rates in 
terms of value and fluctuations. Niyimbanira (2013) confirmed the positive unidirectional 
causal relationship found between oil prices and inflation rates. Wakeford’s (2012) research 
corroborates the findings of this study with reference to exchange rates depreciation, exports 
expansion, especially coal and inflation rise. A more recent paper of Sibanda, Hove and 
Murirapchena (2015) argued that the reason is the heavy dependence on oil. This claim 
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becomes more consistent if one considers the importance of oil in the production function, 
the transportation and other energy prerequisites in one hand, and the absence of “commercial 
oil deposits” in South Africa (Nkomo, 2006). 
Concerning the positive relationship between oil prices increases and exports, it could be 
argued that an oil prices escalation would increase the demand for coal, where South Africa 
holds 95% of the whole continent’s reserves (EIA, 2015). Besides, and because of the 
Inflation Targeting regime adopted, the South African Reserve Bank relied on interest rates to 
extenuate any shocks impact (South African Reserve Bank, n.d.) The efforts made to stabilise 
inflation or currency depreciation likely involved greater increasing of interest rates, which 
may represent an explanation for the insignificance found in this study. Additionally, and as 
has been explained by Nkomo (2006), the consequential dependence on imported oil 
generated those anticipated results. With a weak national currency, interest rates would 
experience a sharp jump; the national income would be declining as well as the South 
Africans purchasing power, accentuated by a stagnation of the economic growth. 
Lastly, and regarding the asymmetric model, it could be said that the impact of scaled oil prices 
increases is significant when compared to scaled oil prices decreases. 
 
5. How accurate is the model for predicting?  
Christ (1951) asserted that “the ultimate test of an econometric model comes with checking its 
prediction”. Therefore, it seems interesting after this analysis and discussion to see how robust 
the VAR is for predicting. The idea was to make a comparison with one of the first papers 
analysing the forecasting ability, namely Meese and Rogoff (1983, 1986). Their results 
revealed that the post-sample forecasting of exchange rates could be improved if a  “naïve” 
random walk were used. It turned out to give a substantially better  performance since the 
eighties (Evans and Lyons, 2005). The outcomes were surprising as they were comparing two 
models:   
 
 𝑥1,𝑡 =  𝜀𝑡     (7) 
 𝑥1,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑡𝑥2𝑡−1+ 𝜀𝑡   (8) 
Where H0: 𝛽𝑡 =  𝛽
∗ = 0 (Rossi, 2006) 
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The null hypothesis could not be rejected; the random walk is, therefore, a fairly accurate model 
to forecast the data. In addition, they concluded that the poor performance of the structural 
models is most likely related to international oil price volatility or to the different 
macroeconomic policies adopted by central banks.  Those factors might have highly accounted 
for “structural instability”. 
Those outcomes have led to a contentious debate, where the literature saw a division between 
papers confirming those findings and others rejecting them. For instance, Cheung, Chinn and 
Pascal (2005) concluded that through the RMSE comparison, the random walk cannot be 
defeated by structural models. Likewise, Kilian and Taylor (2003) revealed that from a 1 to 12-
steps ahead forecast, it is hard to find a model outperforming the random walk. However, 
numerous papers found that fundamental models such as Menzie and Alquist (2006) and 
Brooks et al. (2001), (cited in Anaraki, 2007) perform better. Some papers such as Thomakos 
and Guerard (2004) found that the elementary models are not necessarily the most robust and 
that ARIMA models, for instance, proved more reliable in terms of forecasting. Similarly, Den 
Butter and Jansen (2013) found that although the random walk seems to be the best fit for the 
data forecast, the ARIMA models showed satisfactory performance. 
Thus, it appears valuable to compare the VAR model used by this paper to an AR (1) model 
forecasting the inflation. The criterion order was determined through the SBIC and the HQIC.  
 
Table 23: Lag Order - CPI: 
CPI: Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
SBIC 1 3 1 1 1 
HQIC 1 3 4 1 3 
 
 
The last year of data was removed from the dataset, and forecasted by the VAR model, and 
then the AR (1). The Root Mean Square Error was calculated with the real values. 
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AR (1): 𝑥𝑡+1 =  𝛼 𝑥𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡+1 ;  𝑣𝑡+1 ~ Ν (0, 𝜎
2)  (9)    
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 =  √∑
(𝐹𝑡−𝑅𝑡)²
𝑁
𝑁=12
𝑖=1  ;       (10) 
Where Ft is the forecasted value and Rt is the real value 
 
Table 24 below shows the RMSE of both models for every country. The forecast shows no 
significant difference between the VAR forecast and the AR forecasts, although the VAR 
turned to be slightly better with smaller RMSE. Hence, it could be argued that neither the VAR 
nor the AR is significantly accurate at predicting inflation. Nevertheless, as claimed by Rossi 
(2006), it is likely that the majority of models lead to unsatisfactory forecasts even though it 
suits adequately the in-sample. 
 
 
Table 5: VAR and AR’s Forecast evaluation – RMSE 
 
 Model RMSE 
Brazil 
VAR 0.0028 
AR(1) 0.0027 
Russia 
VAR 0.0064 
AR(3) 0.0069 
India 
VAR 0.0071 
AR(1) 0.0073 
China 
VAR 0.1938 
AR (1) 0.1827 
South Africa 
VAR 0.0040 
AR(1) 0.0045 
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Figure 6: Forecasts 
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Ultimately, the findings of this paper varied depending on whether the country is oil-
importing or oil-exporting. For India, China and South Africa, and even though every country 
has its own specificities, the impact tended to be similar and negative on the economy. With 
regards to Russia and Brazil, they witnessed similar general patterns especially in terms of 
total industrial production, unemployment rates, exchange rates, exports and imports. The 
difference was noticed concerning inflation and interest rates, which is likely due to high 
Brazilian imports of petroleum products, whilst Russia is a net exporter. 
Broadly speaking, it seems clear that oil prices changes have a considerable impact on total 
industrial production and both imports and exports. This direct impact was not as significant 
when it comes to inflation and interest rates due to monetary policies, although it may be 
suggested that both variables are subject to indirect impact.  
A point worth mentioning is the reliability of both Indian and Chinese data. With respect to 
India, the Reserve Bank of India’s governor raised concerns about the accuracy of the data 
collected. In fact, he qualified the issue as a “challenge”, and highlighted the need for 
opportune and rigorous “statistical system” (Reserve Bank of India, 2011). He also shed the 
light on the lack of employment data as mentioned above in the variables choice subsection of 
this paper. Regarding China, Koch-Weser (2013) argued that notwithstanding the reforms 
adopted by the authorities, the Chinese data are not credible compared to the European or 
American data. He pointed out three main issues, namely the data collection process, the 
measurements used and the way the data is presented. Falsification problems and transparency 
also represented an obstacle with regards to the reliability of the statistics (China, Koch-Weser, 
2013).  
 
 
Conclusion:  
This paper considered the importance of the impact of oil prices fluctuations on different 
macroeconomic variables in the BRICS, namely inflation rates using consumer price indexes, 
interest rates, unemployment rates, exchange rates, imports, exports, and total industrial 
production. The research was built upon on the Granger causality test, the impulse response 
function and the Cholesky variance decomposition by fitting both linear and non-linear VAR 
models. The findings suggest that oil price fluctuations have an important impact on the 
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BRICS economies, mainly on total industrial production and both imports and exports. 
Moreover, the outcomes of this paper corroborate the literature in evidence of asymmetry 
found, as the impact of scaled oil prices increases differed from scaled oil prices decreases. 
Lastly, a limitation of this research consists in not including the money supply in the model as 
done by Du et al. (2010), a variable that may give a clearer image with regards to its role in 
capturing the indirect effect of oil prices shocks. However, as aforementioned, the limited data 
availability represented an obstacle. Another limitation may be related to the lack of analysis 
of the transmission channels of oil prices variations through alternative prices such as other 
energy prices (coal, electricity as an example). 
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Appendix 1: KPSS test for stationarity 
H0: The variable is trend stationary 
Critical Values: 10%: 0.119; 5%: 0.146; 2.5%: 0.176; 1%: 0.216 
 Brazil: 
LAG 
ORDER 
LN 
OIL 
D.LNOIL LN 
TPI 
D.LN 
TPI 
LN 
CPI 
D.LN 
CPI 
IR D.IR 
0 1.12 0.104 1.540 0.061 3.320 0.414 0.892 0.012 
1 0.58 0.083 0.819 0.065 1.690 0.242 0.486 0.014 
2 0.4 0.074 0.572 0.068 1.150 0.184 0.343 0.015 
3 0.31 0.069 0.448 0.069 0.873 0.153 0.272 0.015 
4 0.257 0.066 0.374 0.070 0.709 0.135 0.230 0.015 
5 0.222 0.065 0.324 0.073 0.601 0.124 0.204 0.017 
6 0.197 0.066 0.289 0.075 0.523 0.115 0.186 0.018 
7 0.179 0.068 0.263 0.077 0.465 0.109 0.173 0.020 
8 0.165 0.070 0.243 0.078 0.420 0.105 0.163 0.021 
9 0.153 0.073 0.227 0.081 0.384 0.100 0.156 0.023 
10 0.144 0.075 0.214 0.083 0.354 0.097 0.150 0.025 
11 0.137 0.075 0.203 0.086 0.329 0.093 0.146 0.026 
12 0.131 0.076 0.194 0.089 0.308 0.090 0.142 0.027 
13 0.126 0.077 0.187 0.090 0.291 0.087 0.139 0.028 
14 0.121 0.079 0.180 0.093 0.275 0.085 0.137 0.028 
 
 
LAG 
ORDER 
UR D.UR 
LN 
EXR 
D.LN 
EXR 
LN 
EXP 
D.LN 
EXP 
LN 
IMP 
D.LN 
IMP 
0 3.790 0.087 4.410 0.118 2.060 0.062 3.910 0.034 
1 1.930 0.096 2.230 0.117 1.080 0.085 2.020 0.063 
2 1.310 0.095 1.500 0.116 0.735 0.098 1.370 0.067 
3 0.993 0.093 1.130 0.117 0.563 0.105 1.040 0.078 
4 0.807 0.092 0.915 0.117 0.459 0.111 0.839 0.075 
5 0.682 0.091 0.769 0.117 0.389 0.111 0.707 0.077 
6 0.594 0.089 0.664 0.117 0.339 0.116 0.613 0.079 
7 0.528 0.089 0.586 0.120 0.302 0.118 0.542 0.079 
8 0.476 0.088 0.525 0.123 0.273 0.115 0.487 0.079 
9 0.435 0.087 0.476 0.126 0.249 0.114 0.443 0.079 
10 0.402 0.088 0.436 0.129 0.231 0.115 0.408 0.082 
11 0.374 0.088 0.402 0.134 0.215 0.113 0.378 0.081 
12 0.351 0.089 0.374 0.138 0.202 0.119 0.353 0.086 
13 0.330 0.091 0.350 0.142 0.191 0.117 0.331 0.086 
14 0.313 0.093 0.329 0.145 0.181 0.119 0.313 0.090 
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 Russia  
 
LAG 
ORDER 
LN 
OIL 
D.LNOIL LN 
TPI 
D.LN 
TPI 
LN 
CPI 
D.LN 
CPI 
IR D.IR 
0 1.120 0.104 1.890 0.080 4.990 0.279 2.900 0.228 
1 0.580 0.083 0.974 0.095 2.530 0.208 1.480 0.295 
2 0.400 0.074 0.663 0.109 1.710 0.174 1.010 0.299 
3 0.310 0.069 0.505 0.118 1.300 0.148 0.766 0.265 
4 0.257 0.066 0.410 0.113 1.050 0.131 0.623 0.268 
5 0.222 0.065 0.346 0.112 0.882 0.120 0.528 0.257 
6 0.197 0.066 0.301 0.113 0.764 0.113 0.460 0.231 
7 0.179 0.068 0.268 0.115 0.675 0.108 0.410 0.223 
8 0.165 0.070 0.241 0.114 0.606 0.105 0.371 0.205 
9 0.153 0.073 0.221 0.111 0.551 0.102 0.340 0.194 
10 0.144 0.075 0.204 0.112 0.506 0.100 0.315 0.183 
11 0.137 0.075 0.190 0.111 0.468 0.099 0.295 0.176 
12 0.131 0.076 0.178 0.112 0.437 0.098 0.277 0.168 
13 0.126 0.077 0.168 0.111 0.409 0.098 0.263 0.162 
14 0.121 0.079 0.160 0.110 0.386 0.098 0.251 0.157 
 
 
LAG 
ORDER 
UR D.UR 
LN 
EXR 
D.LN 
EXR 
LN 
EXP 
D.LN 
EXP 
LN 
IMP 
D.LN 
IMP 
0 1.870 0.285 4.050 0.257 1.660 0.025 2.370 0.021 
1 0.942 0.193 2.040 0.196 0.888 0.035 1.270 0.032 
2 0.632 0.146 1.370 0.171 0.616 0.047 0.872 0.044 
3 0.477 0.120 1.030 0.153 0.475 0.051 0.668 0.056 
4 0.385 0.105 0.833 0.142 0.389 0.052 0.543 0.057 
5 0.324 0.095 0.699 0.135 0.332 0.051 0.459 0.059 
6 0.280 0.088 0.604 0.130 0.291 0.056 0.399 0.063 
7 0.248 0.082 0.532 0.127 0.261 0.059 0.354 0.070 
8 0.223 0.078 0.477 0.125 0.237 0.060 0.318 0.068 
9 0.203 0.075 0.432 0.124 0.219 0.060 0.290 0.069 
10 0.187 0.072 0.396 0.123 0.203 0.064 0.268 0.074 
11 0.174 0.069 0.366 0.121 0.191 0.077 0.248 0.099 
12 0.163 0.067 0.341 0.120 0.180 0.069 0.232 0.076 
13 0.153 0.066 0.320 0.120 0.170 0.069 0.218 0.074 
14 0.145 0.065 0.301 0.119 0.162 0.073 0.206 0.076 
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 India  
 
LAG 
ORDER 
LN 
OIL 
D.LNOIL LN 
TPI 
D.LN 
TPI 
LN 
CPI 
D.LN 
CPI 
IR D.IR 
0 1.12 0.104 2.29 0.0713 4.85 0.211 2.46 0.0143 
1 0.58 0.083 1.19 0.108 2.46 0.163 1.38 0.0195 
2 0.4 0.074 0.806 0.123 1.65 0.152 0.974 0.0218 
3 0.31 0.069 0.613 0.128 1.25 0.145 0.759 0.025 
4 0.257 0.066 0.497 0.136 1 0.144 0.626 0.0259 
5 0.222 0.065 0.419 0.134 0.843 0.151 0.536 0.0278 
6 0.197 0.066 0.364 0.13 0.727 0.156 0.47 0.0305 
7 0.179 0.068 0.322 0.131 0.641 0.169 0.42 0.032 
8 0.165 0.070 0.29 0.129 0.573 0.184 0.381 0.0315 
9 0.153 0.073 0.264 0.128 0.519 0.195 0.35 0.0328 
10 0.144 0.075 0.243 0.133 0.474 0.201 0.325 0.0343 
11 0.137 0.075 0.225 0.125 0.437 0.202 0.304 0.0357 
12 0.131 0.076 0.211 0.127 0.405 0.193 0.286 0.0364 
13 0.126 0.077 0.198 0.13 0.378 0.185 0.271 0.0369 
14 0.121 0.079 0.187 0.128 0.355 0.178 0.258 0.0392 
 
 
LAG 
ORDER 
UR D.UR 
LN 
EXR 
D.LN 
EXR 
LN 
EXP 
D.LN 
EXP 
LN 
IMP 
D.LN 
IMP 
0 
- 
2.19 0.129 1.93 0.0549 1.92 0.0373 
1 1.15 0.115 1.1 0.0901 1.08 0.0711 
2 0.788 0.114 0.775 0.101 0.752 0.0703 
3 0.603 0.112 0.6 0.101 0.582 0.0752 
4 0.491 0.116 0.493 0.102 0.477 0.0775 
5 0.415 0.114 0.42 0.106 0.407 0.079 
6 0.361 0.108 0.368 0.103 0.357 0.0809 
7 0.321 0.105 0.328 0.104 0.319 0.0868 
8 0.289 0.104 0.298 0.106 0.29 0.0899 
9 0.264 0.103 0.273 0.105 0.266 0.0955 
10 0.244 0.103 0.254 0.109 0.246 0.102 
11 0.227 0.104 0.237 0.109 0.23 0.111 
12 0.213 0.106 0.223 0.114 0.216 0.111 
13 0.201 0.109 0.211 0.117 0.204 0.121 
14 0.191 0.112 0.201 - 0.193 0.119 
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 China  
 
LAG 
ORDER 
LN 
OIL 
D.LNOIL LN 
TPI 
D.LN 
TPI 
LN 
CPI 
D.LN 
CPI 
IR D.IR 
0 1.12 0.104 
Sample contains gaps 
4.44 4.44 
1 0.58 0.083 2.25 2.25 
2 0.4 0.074 1.51 1.51 
3 0.31 0.069 1.14 1.14 
4 0.257 0.066 0.922 0.922 
5 0.222 0.065 0.774 0.774 
6 0.197 0.066 0.668 0.668 
7 0.179 0.068 0.589 0.589 
8 0.165 0.070 0.528 0.528 
9 0.153 0.073 0.479 0.479 
10 0.144 0.075 0.439 0.439 
11 0.137 0.075 0.405 0.405 
12 0.131 0.076 0.378 0.378 
13 0.126 0.077 0.354 0.354 
14 0.121 0.079 0.333 0.333 
 
 
LAG 
ORDER 
UR D.UR 
LN 
EXR 
D.LN 
EXR 
LN 
EXP 
D.LN 
EXP 
LN 
IMP 
D.LN 
IMP 
0 2.81 2.81 5.41 0.467 0.798 0.00718 0.698 0.00826 
1 1.42 1.42 2.72 0.35 0.483 0.0134 0.412 0.015 
2 0.958 0.958 1.82 0.28 0.349 0.0163 0.295 0.021 
3 0.727 0.727 1.37 0.233 0.277 0.0188 0.232 0.0197 
4 0.589 0.589 1.1 0.201 0.233 0.0229 0.194 0.0227 
5 0.497 0.497 0.918 0.18 0.202 0.0239 0.169 0.0245 
6 0.432 0.432 0.79 0.163 0.18 0.0253 0.151 0.0249 
7 0.383 0.383 0.694 0.15 0.164 0.0265 0.138 0.0266 
8 0.346 0.346 0.62 0.14 0.151 0.0272 0.128 0.0286 
9 0.316 0.316 0.56 0.133 0.141 0.0291 0.12 0.029 
10 0.291 0.291 0.512 0.127 0.133 0.0329 0.114 0.0324 
11 0.271 0.271 0.472 0.123 0.127 0.0399 0.109 0.0362 
12 0.254 0.254 0.438 0.119 0.121 0.0342 0.104 0.0345 
13 0.24 0.24 0.409 0.117 0.116 0.0357 0.101 0.0357 
14 0.227 0.227 0.384 0.114 0.112 0.0352 0.0979 0.0373 
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 South Africa  
 
 
 
 
 
LAG 
ORDER 
 
 
 
 
UR 
 
 
 
 
D.UR 
 
 
 
LN 
EXR 
 
 
 
D.LN 
EXR 
 
 
 
LN 
EXP 
 
 
 
D.LN 
EXP 
 
 
 
LN 
IMP 
 
 
 
D.LN  
IMP 
0 
Sample contains 
gaps 
1.65 0.117 1.43 0.0138 1.64 0.0202 
1 0.883 0.114 0.845 0.022 0.948 0.0307 
2 0.607 0.112 0.605 0.0284 0.675 0.0409 
3 0.465 0.11 0.474 0.0286 0.523 0.04 
4 0.379 0.109 0.394 0.0318 0.431 0.0456 
5 0.321 0.111 0.339 0.0328 0.367 0.0508 
6 0.28 0.114 0.299 0.0345 0.321 0.0481 
7 0.248 0.116 0.27 0.0368 0.287 0.0536 
8 0.224 0.114 0.246 0.0397 0.26 0.0564 
9 0.204 0.112 0.227 0.0389 0.238 0.0549 
10 0.189 0.11 0.211 0.0423 0.22 0.0606 
11 0.175 0.107 0.198 0.0465 0.204 0.0682 
12 0.164 0.106 0.186 0.0424 0.191 0.0608 
13 0.155 0.105 0.176 0.0434 0.18 0.0615 
14 0.147 0.105 0.168 0.0444 0.17 0.0612 
 
 
 
  
LAG 
ORDER 
LN 
OIL 
D.LNOIL LN 
TPI 
D.LN 
TPI 
LN 
CPI 
D.LN 
CPI 
IR D.IR 
0 1.12 0.104 1.75 0.0213 1.48 0.259 1.24 0.0692 
1 0.58 0.083 0.922 0.0302 0.771 0.19 0.638 0.0478 
2 0.4 0.074 0.63 0.0346 0.524 0.156 0.436 0.0397 
3 0.31 0.069 0.481 0.0347 0.398 0.134 0.335 0.0359 
4 0.257 0.066 0.391 0.0353 0.323 0.121 0.276 0.0349 
5 0.222 0.065 0.332 0.0349 0.273 0.112 0.236 0.0346 
6 0.197 0.066 0.29 0.0336 0.237 0.103 0.209 0.0346 
7 0.179 0.068 0.258 0.0336 0.21 0.0979 0.188 0.0347 
8 0.165 0.070 0.234 0.0331 0.189 0.0944 0.172 0.035 
9 0.153 0.073 0.215 0.034 0.173 0.0913 0.16 0.0355 
10 0.144 0.075 0.2 0.0342 0.16 0.089 0.15 0.0361 
11 0.137 0.075 0.187 0.0339 0.149 0.0876 0.142 0.0367 
12 0.131 0.076 0.177 0.0345 0.139 0.0857 0.135 0.0375 
13 0.126 0.077 0.168 0.0353 0.132 0.0845 0.129 0.0386 
14 0.121 0.079 0.16 0.0364 0.125 0.0839 0.125 0.0399 
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Appendix 2: Lag Order - CPI: 
 
 
 
Country 
 
HQIC SBIC 
    
    
Brazil 
0 -7.98167 -7.97256   
1 -8.66382* -8.6456* 
2 -8.64963 -8.62229 
3 -8.64623 -8.60979 
4 -8.63308 -8.58752 
    
Russia 
   
0 -4.58863 -4.57984   
1 -4.71856 -4.70099 
2 -4.73089 -4.70453 
3 -4.7817* -4.74656* 
4 -4.77494 -4.73101  
    
India 
   
0 -6.65027 -6.64148   
1 -6.75911 -6.74154* 
2 -6.75398 -6.72762 
3 -6.74716 -6.71202 
4 -6.76034* -6.71641 
    
China 
   
0 .085165 .096677 
1 .073283* .096307* 
2 .09379 .128325 
3 .110194 .156241 
4 .096543 .154101  
    
South 
Africa 
   
0 -7.89447 -7.88568   
1 -8.02917 -8.0116* 
2 -8.03551 -8.00916 
3 -8.04005* -8.0049 
4 -8.02561 -7.98168 
    
